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ADVISORY SUCCESSION IN REAL ESTATE
INVESTMENT TRUSTS
Since the late 1960's, one of the fastest growing forms of in-
vestment in the United States has been the Real Estate Investment
Trust (REIT).1  It now appears, however, that the REIT industry
1. Over a decade ago Congress inserted the Real Estate Investment Trust Act
of 1960 into the Internal Revenue Code, INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 856-58, thereby
laying the foundation for the attractiveness of the REIT as an investment vehicle. The
provisions added by the Act allow a business trust which derives most of its income
from investments in real estate, id. § 856(c), and which meets certain other qualifica-
tions, including the return of 90% of current capital and ordinary income to share-
holders, id. § 857(a)(1), to avoid payment of any federal income tax on that portion
of the trust income which is actually distributed to its shareholders during or with
respect to the taxable year. Id. § 857(b).
Initially, most RET's generated their profits by taking equity positions in various
real estate investments. See Buffington, A Brief Description of the Real Estate Invest-
ment Trust Industry and Its Tax Problems, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 1973,
273-74 (Practising Law Institute 1973). By 1968, with investments concentrated in
these so-called "equity REI'Ps," id., there were only five REIT's with combined assets
of approximately ten million dollars. Gutmann, Analyst's Viewpoint-Mutual Funds
for Real Estate, THE MAGAZINE OF WALL STREET, April 24, 1971, at 32. However,
during 1969 through 1971, soaring interest rates and a favorable outlook in the real
estate and construction industry sparked the development of a new type of "mortgage
REIT" which generated its profits primarily from interest income on real estate mort-
gages. See Buffington, supra, at 275. This development brought about a surge of in-
vestment in REIT's, id., and by 1972 there were approximately 180 REIT's, whose as-
sets totalled more than 11 billion dollars. DICKEY, REPORT OF THE REAL ESTATE AD-
vIsoRY COMMITEE TO THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, Oct. 12, 1972, at
92. Recently, total REIT asset value has been estimated at nearly 20 billion dollars.
REITs Face Shake-Out as Investments Sour, Cash Sources Dry Up, The Wall Street
Journal, Jan. 21, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
THE FOLLOWING HEREAFTER CITATIONS ARE USED IN THIS NOTE:
Meyer & Sprayregen, Equity Trusts: Real Estate Capitalists of the Seventies, 3
REAL ESTATE REV. 81 (Summer 1973) [hereinafter cited as Meyer & Sprayregen];
Midwest Securities Commissioners Association, Statement of Policy on Real Estate
Investment Trusts, Adopted on July 16, 1970, 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. If 4801 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as 1970 Statement];
R. POWELL & P. ROHAN, THE LAW OF REAL oPERTY (1973) [hereinafter cited as
POWELL];
REPORT OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION ON PUBLIC POLICY IM-
PLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT COMPANY GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1966) [hereinafter cited as SEC PUBLIC POLICY REPORT];
Sterrett, Reward for Mutual Fund Sponsor Entrepreneurial Risk, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 195 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Sterrett].
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
may be facing a major "shake-out."2 As a consequence of the recent
decline in the economic performance of the real estate and construction
industry, many REIT's have found themselves saddled with heavy debt
service requirements while holding investment portfolios increasingly
made up of mortgages to defaulting developers. 8  If and when this
shake-out occurs, many REIT shareholders4 will search for means by
which they may recoup their losses.
In their efforts to recover, disgruntled REIT shareholders are
likely to look first to the REIT's investment adviser 5 to whom the trust-
ees frequently delegate the active management of the REIT, including
2. See, e.g., Are the REITs Played Out? FoRBEs, Nov. 1, 1973, at 26; Morgello,
Wall Street: Where the Yields Are, NEWSWEEK, FEB. 18, 1974, at 74; REITs Face
Shake-Out, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1. See also A REIT Files For Protection Under
Chapter 11, The Wall Street Journal, Mar. 18, 1974, at 5, col. 1 (describing the first
bankruptcy filing by an REIT ever reported).
3. It has been suggested that most REIT's can tolerate holding from three to five
percent of their loan portfolios in defaulted loans without substantial impairment of
earnings. REITs Face Shake-Out, supra note 1, at 1, col. 1. However, "[flor many
REITs, loans in default or involved in foreclosure proceedings have increased sharply
in recent months to where they now account for more than 10% of investment port-
folios." Id. As a result of these defaults and their impairment of REIT earnings,
many REI'rs are finding it difficult to attract additional investment funds. Id. at 27,
col. 5. This problem is acutely exacerbated by the fact that REIT's, unlike the other-
wise highly similar mutual funds, usually borrow heavily against their equity capital.
In a favorable economic climate the REIT thus increases the return on the sharehold-
ers' equity investment by the spread between the rates it must pay on these borrowed
funds and the higher rates it charges on its construction loans. Id. However, this
highly leveraged position also imposes upon the REIT the necessity of generating a
continuous inflow of funds to meet the relentless interest payments due on its heavy
debt. As external investment in REIT's begins to slow and defaults by developers on
REIT construction loans threaten the REIT's capacity to generate funds internally,
their ability to meet their heavy debt commitments has come sharply into question,
and a number of experts have predicted ". . . a real industry shake-out as cash-pressed
REITs sell out at bargain prices and merge with the stronger ones." Id. at 27, col.
6.
4. An REIT almost universally adopts the form of a publicly-held business or
"Massachusetts" trust. 4A PowELL 573B[1]. Equitable ownership of an REIT rests
in its shareholders, id. at 573A, while legal ownership of the trust is vested in trustees
elected by the shareholders to manage it, id. at 573B[6][i].
5. In several recent cases, REIT shareholders have successfully sued their ad-
visers. Greenspun v. Bogan, Nos. 73-1303 & -1304 (1st Cir., Feb. 22, 1974) (approving
settlement providing for reduced advisory fees); Ridley v. Continental Ill. Realty, No.
C 19550 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974) (Notice of Intended Decision),
discussed in note 58 infra.
The shareholders' stake in such suits may be extremely large, for if an REIT
fails, its shareholders may lose more than their investment in its stock. In many
states the possibility exists that REIT shareholders have unlimited liability for trust
debts. Comment, The Real Estate Investment Trust: State Tax, Tort, and Contract
Liabilities of the Trust, Trustee, and Shareholder, 71 MIcii. L. R1v. 808, 815-17
(1973).
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responsibility for the selection and policing of investments.6 Not only
is the adviser frequently the party that initially sponsored the trust,7
but also the adviser, for several reasons, enjoys considerably greater con-
trol than its title and even its substantial managerial authority would
seem to imply. First, trustees are not independent of the REIT ad-
viser,' and even the unaffiliated trustees who have no financial in-
terest in the adviser often owe their selection and retention to the ad-
viser's endorsement.9  Furthermore, trustees who feel no special
allegiance to the adviser may be extremely hesitant to suggest its
ouster because of the difficulty of ascertaining whether a proposed suc-
cessor would be more effective than the incumbent, the disruption which
would occur in the management of the REIT's affairs, 1° and the re-
alization that at least some REIT shareholders may have invested in re-
liance upon the incumbent adviser's reputation.11 The cumulative ef-
fect of these factors is that the REIT adviser, in addition to exerting
a substantial degree of control over the REIT's operations, typically
labors under little if any fear of being involuntarily removed by the
trustees or shareholders.12
6. 4A POWELL 573B[6][a]; Meyer & Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 83; Schulkin,
Real Estate Investment Trusts, FIANcAL ANA.YsTs J., May/June 1971, at 35-36. The
typical duration of an advisory contract is from one to three years, Schulkin, supra
at 35, although this seems not a practically operative limitation on the adviser's tenure.
See note 12 infra and accompanying text. Although the adviser can be an individual,
it is typically a corporation. See Bartram, Connecticut General's Approach to the Real
Estate Investment Trust, 109 TRUsTS & EstATES 870 (1970); Downes, Why Chase Man-
hattan Sponsored a Real Estate Investment Trust, 109 TRusTs & ESTATES 1026 (1970);
Tyson, Banks Finding Many Benefits in Sponsoring Formation of REITs, Chiefly Man-
agement Fees, AM. BANR, Oct. 14, 1970, at 1.
7. Korobow & Gelson, REITs: Impact on Mortgage Credit, 40 APPRAISAL J. 43
(1972); see Meyer & Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 83.
8. Many sponsors of REIT's, in order to assure their retention as adviser, name
directors and officers of their own company or affiliated companies to serve as trustees
for newly formed REIT's. NATIONAL ASS'N Op REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT FUNDS 383,
673 (1971-72 ed. 1971). "Normally, 51 percent of the [REIT] trustees are independ-
ent of the manager. However, there are exceptions." Remarks of Don Augustine,
REAL EsTATE INVESTMENT TRusTs 10 (Practising Law Institute 1970).
9. Remarks of Don Augustine, supra note 8.
10. It has been stated that mutual fund shareholders have no choice but to approve
the advisory contract because "[ilf such approval were withheld by either [directors or
shareholders], this would have the disasterous [sic] consequence of leaving the company
without management." H.R. REP. No. 1382, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. at 87 (1970).
11. See 4A POWELL f 573B[6][c][ii]; Adler, Real Estate Investment Trusts and
the Commercial Banker, JOURNAL OF COMMERCIAL BANK LENDiNG, Sept. 1972, at
23 (observing that -the prominent financial institutions, which are among the leading
sponsors of REIT's, commonly incorporate their names in the name of the sponsored
REIT of which they then become the adviser); cf. Jaretzki, Duties and Responsibilities of
Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAw & CON'rEMP. PROB. 777, 786 (1964).
12. The problem of an independent board "kicking out" the manager is not a
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This degree of control has enabled the typical REIT adviser to
anticipate, in addition to significant management fees, 13 a rather un-
usual form of "retirement benefits." Where it has chosen to relin-
quish its position, the REIT adviser has traditionally been able to ex-
tract from its designate among the aspiring replacements a "succession
fee"-an amount arguably representing payment for the incumbent's
valuable expectation of contract renewal,' 4 as well as for its decisive
recommendation of a successor.' 5
real fear.
I think if you look for an analogy to the mutual funds you will see veryfew, if any, when management has been ousted. Remarks of Don Augustine,
supra note 8.
Mr. Augustine's remarks are directly confirmed by the experience of the Securities Ex-
change Commission, which has observed no such ouster of an investment adviser in
the mutual fund area. See note 21 infra.
13. Cf. Adler, supra note 11, at 29. This fee is usually one to one-and-one-half
percent annually of the total invested assets of the trust, which generally includes all
outstanding loans and loans to which the trust is committed in the future. Cates,
Banks' Big Stakes in "REIT" Field, BANKER'S MONTHLY, Aug. 15, 1970, at 45. One
student commentator has concluded that shareholders often lack effective control over
these fees. See Note, Real Estate Investment Trusts: A Current Assessment, 39
BROoKLYN L. Rnv. 590, 607 (1973).
14. See Jaretzki, The Investment Company Act: Problems Relating to Investment
Advisory Contracts, 45 VA. L. REv. 1023, 1032 (1959).
It can be persuasively argued that an adviser does not deserve to be compensated
for his expectation of contract renewal, since this expectation does not arise out of
his own efforts or performance as an adviser, nor out of the agreement among the
parties as embodied in the typical advisory contract, but instead springs from the ad-
viser's practical power to control his renewal or the appointment of his successor in
spite of the fund's governing instruments. See Sterrett at 239-47.
15. An advisory office can in effect be transferred where the advisory contract
terminates according to its stated term or pursuant to an adviser's exercise of its op-
tion to terminate and a new adviser is thereafter selected; where there is a conven-
tional assignment by the adviser; where the adviser is merged or consolidated into an-
other corporation controlled by a different group of shareholders; or where the con-
trolling block of shares in the adviser is sold. However, the advisory agreement is
likely to impose restrictions on assignment of advisory office. See note 94 infra.
In situations where controlling shareholders in a corporate REIT adviser are sell-
ing their interest, the allegation has been made that any amount they receive in excess
of the net asset value of their shares represents a succession fee. See notes 43-57
infra and accompanying text. A partial response to this claim is that such an
excess may represent an ordinary corporate control premium--a payment which
seems to be generally recognized as valid, see W. CARY, COR'ORATIONS 827 (4th
ed. 1969), though several theories have developed by which such payments
have been successfully attacked in recent years. Id. at 827-31. Furthermore, such a
payment may constitute compensation for goodwill built up by the adviser. Thus, in
Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 697-98 (2nd Cir. 1972), the court stated:
With its impressive record of performance, the Corporation [a mutual fund
adviser in whom the defendants had sold a controlling block] would have had
little difficulty in forming a new fund or in selling its services to existing ones
or to other institutional investors. Although the value deriving from this po-
tential would hardly have been as great as the capitalization of the Corpora-
[Vol. 1974:123
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Recently, the retention of a succession fee by an investment ad-
viser in the mutual fund area has come under attack. In Rosenfeld v.
Black' 6 the Second Circuit held that an outgoing mutual fund adviser
may not receive a succession fee since the acceptance of such a pay-
ment from an incoming adviser would violate the incumbent's fidu-
ciary duty to the fund's shareholders. The initial resemblance be-
tween REIT advisers and mutual fund advisers is striking.' 7 A mu-
tual fund adviser, like its counterpart in the REIT area, regularly as-
sumes almost complete management of the enterprise's affairs, includ-
ing the important function of investment selection. 18 Furthermore,
mutual fund advisers, like REIT advisers, are generally the founders
of the fund, 9 remain in office as long as desired,"0 and have the ef-
tion's earnings as adviser to a fund which had grown to some $937,400,000 in
net assets. . and paid $2,290,203 in management fees [during the six-month
period immediately preceding the sale], even after termination of its contracts
with the Fund, [it] would be worth something more than the figure shown
in the balance sheet.
Similarly, the SEC has also conceded that such payments may be justifiable to the
extent that they reflect compensation to the retiring management "for the elements
of value in the relationship which they may have built up over the years." SEC PUB-
LIC POLICY REPORT 152. Thus, where an excess over net asset value is paid for the
shares of a corporate REIT adviser, it would seem inappropriate to include within the
definition of an advisory succession fee those portions of that excess which in fact
constitute an otherwise legally valid control premium or compensation for goodwill.
Furthermore, it may also be asserted that part of such an excess received on the
sale of controlling interest in a corporate RElT adviser, or part of a direct payment by
an incoming adviser to an incumbent, represents a payment for successful risk-taking.
Where the adviser previously served as the sponsor of the REIT, it is very likely
that the sponsor-advisor subjected its money to an entrepreneurial risk by seeking inves-
tos and by incurring the startup expenses of the REIT. See Sterrett 266-67. Where it
can be shown that a portion of such a payment constitutes a capitalization of successful
risk-taking of this type, it too should arguably not be labeled an advisory succession fee.
In apparent recognition of these principles, the Los Angeles County Superior Court
recently stated that "the receipt by the . . . [adviser's] shareholders for their stock of an
amount in excess of the net asset value of the stock does not, per se, amount to a
prohibited sale of office or receipt of consideration for a breach of fiduciary obliga-
tion." Ridley v. Continental Ill. Realty, No. C 19550, at 28 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974) (Notice of Intended Decision), discussed in note 58 infra.
However, delineating what represents a succession fee from what is being paid
for control, goodwill, and capitalization of successful risk-taking is likely to be difficult
in practice. Such delineation may be so speculative that permitting payment for these
latter elements would result in the danger of allowing a hidden succession fee as well.
16. 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g 319 F. Supp. 891 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
17. Because of their similarity, REIT's are sometimes referred to as "the mutual
funds of real estate." Rose, Real Estate Investment Trusts: How They Grow and
Go, JOuNAL OF COMMERCIAL BANK LENDING, Sept. 1972, at 11.
18. See Survey, The Mutual Fund Industry: A Legal Survey, 44 NOTRE DAME
LAw. 732, 881-86 (1969). See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
19. Most mutual funds are established by their initial adviser. SEC PUBLIC Poucy
REPORT 46; WHARTON SCHOOL OF FINANCE AND CoMMERCE, A STUDY OF MuTUAL
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fective power to choose a successor.2 ' Thus, although the wisdom of
the Rosenfeld decision has generated much controversy,22 its potential
application to REIT's has frustrated the ability of REIT advisers to profit
from their departure.2 3 This Note will attempt to ascertain whether Ros-
enfeld's flat prohibition of advisory succession fees should be applied to
REIT's. In addressing this issue it will examine: the factual back-
ground and the basic premises of the Rosenfeld decision;2 4 factors which
possibly distinguish mutual fund advisers from REIT advisers;25
methods which may be utilized to circumvent the Rosenfeld rule if it is
indeed applied to REIT's;26 and the feasibility of applying a "fairness
test" rather than a flat prohibition to REIT succession fees.
Rosenfeld v. Black: RESTRICTIONS ON SUCCESSION FEES
In Rosenfeld the plaintiffs were shareholders in the Lazard Fund
FUNDS, H.R. REP. No. 2274, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 44-51 (1962). Similarly, most REIT's
are sponsored by their initial adviser. See authorities cited note 7 supra.
20. See WHARTON STUoy, supra note 19, at 8, 24, 449, 453, 463-65; Jaretzki, Duties
and Responsibilities of Directors of Mutual Funds, 29 LAw & CONTEMP. PRoB. 777,
786 (1964); Nutt, A Study of Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. Rnv.
179, 216 (1971); SEC PUBLIC PoLIcY REPORT 129. See generally Hearings on H.R.
9510 & H.R. 9511 Before the Subcomm. of Commerce and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 633, 671
(1967) (statements of R. Jennings & M. Cohen, respectively).
21. The SEC has stated that "[it] knows of no instance where fund shareholders have
rejected a new advisory contract proposed by their managers in connection with a sale
by them of the [adviser]." SEC PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 150. See Ridley v. Continental
Ill. Realty, No. C 19550 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974) (Notice of
Intended Decision) (where merger agreement between incumbent and successor adviser
was contingent upon shareholder approval of management contract with successor, REIT
shareholders approved the agreement by a vote of 1,842,036 to 12,407). For the
facts of this case, see note 58 infra. See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
22. E.g., Sterrett; Note, Fiduciary Requirements and the Succession Fee Upon the
Change of Mutual Fund Advisers, 85 HARv. L. REV. 655 (1972); Note, Advisory Suc-
cession in the Mutual Fund Industry, 67 Nw. U.L. REv. 278 (1972); Note, Common
Law Prophylactic Rule Threatens Traditional Mutual Fund-Investment Adviser Rela-
tionship, 45 So. CALIF. L. REv. 1150 (1972); Note, Mutual Fund Control-Transfer
Profits: Congress, The SEC, and Rosenfeld v. Black, 58 VA. L. REv. 371 (1972);
46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1029 (1971); 50 TEx. L. REv. 583 (1972).
23. In addition to Ridley v. Continental Ill. Realty, No. C 19550 (Los Angeles
County Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974) (Notice of Intended Decision), discussed in note
58 infra, two other cases have been filed: one in connection with the sale of an REIT
adviser to Builders Investment Group of Valley Forge, Pennsylvania and the other in
connection with the transfer of the adviser of Citizens Mortgage Investment Trust of
Southfield, Michigan. Letter from G.N. Buffington, Executive Vice-President and
General Counsel, National Association of Real Estate Investment Trusts, Inc., to the
Duke Law Journal, Mar. 14, 1974.
24. See text accompanying notes 28-38 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 39-78 infra.
26. See text accompanying notes 79-110 infra.
27. See text accompanying notes 111-131 infra.
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(the Fund), a mutual fund organized by the defendant Lazard Freres
& Co. (Lazard), which had also served as the Fund's adviser since
its inception. With the knowledge and approval of the Fund's di-
rectors, Lazard arranged for a merger of the Fund into a second mu-
tual fund to be organized by Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., whose subsidiary
was then to become the adviser of the resulting combined fund. 8
In addition to arranging the merger, Lazard, which controlled the
Fund's proxy machinery, solicited the necessary shareholder approval
of the merger and the new advisory contract.29  Pursuant to a con-
tract contingent upon the merger, Dun & Bradstreet agreed to pay
Lazard 75,000 shares of its common stock.3" Prior to shareholder
approval of the agreement, shareholders of the Lazard Fund brought an
action for an injunction and accounting against Lazard, Dun & Brad-
street, and its subsidiaries, alleging in essence that Lazard, as a fidu-
ciary, could not be allowed to profit from its role in the selection of a
new adviser by the receipt of such a payment. 1 The defendants coun-
tered that the true consideration given by Lazard for these shares was
that stated in its contract with Dun & Bradstreet-a covenant not -to
compete in the mutual fund field and other -promises to assist tem-
porarily in operating the fund after the merger.32
Agreeing that Lazard's conduct might have violated a fiduciary
duty to the Fund's shareholders, the Second Circuit reversed a sum-
mary judgment for the defendants and remanded the case for a fac-
tual determination of the true basis for the payment.33 In so doing the
court held that (1) a mutual fund investment adviser occupies a fidu-
ciary position with respect to the fund's shareholders; 4 (2) under
common law principles which prohibit a fiduciary from selling its of-
fice, mutual fund shareholders are entitled to recover "any payment
28. 445 F.2d at 1339.
29. The Investment Company Act of 1940 makes it unlawful for any person to
serve as adviser to a mutual fund except pursuant to a vote of a majority of the fund's
shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15 (1970). The Act makes it explicit that a change
of adviser in any form requires shareholder approval. After broadly defining "assign-
ment" to include "any direct or indirect transfer or hypothecation of a contract or
chose in action by the assignor, or of a controlling block of the assignor's outstanding
voting securities by a security holder of the assignor," the Act then mandates that an
advisory contract provide "in substance, for its automatic termination in the event of
its assignment." 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(4), -15(a)(4) (1970).
30. 445 F.2d at 1340.
31. Id. at 1341-42.
32. Id. at 1339-40.
33. Id. at 1342-48. Before this factual determination was made, the parties in the
case reached a $1,000,000 settlement which was approved by the district court. Rosen-
feld v. Black, 336 F. Supp. 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
34. 445 F.2d at 1342. See notes 59-60 infra and accompanying text.
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made to the outgoing adviser by his successor. . . over and above the
value of any continuing services"; 5 and (3) the Investment Company
Act of 194036 impliedly incorporated this common law prohibition. 7
By so holding, the Second Circuit attempted to ensure that the de-
parting adviser's recommendation of a successor would not be influ-
enced by the prospect of personal gain, but would be based solely upon
an objective judgment as to the best interests of the beneficiary."m
THE APPLICATION OF Rosenfeld v. Black TO REIT'S
The Inapplicability of the Investment Company Act
Unlike mutual funds, REIT's are not subject to the Investment
Company Act of 1940, since virtually all REIT's fall within the Act's
exemption for companies primarily engaged in "purchasing or other-
wise acquiring mortgages and other liens on interests in real estate."801
It might thus be contended that the source of the prohibition of suc-
cession fees announced in Rosenfeld was the Investment Company Act,
and that Rosenfeld therefore does not provide a precedent for denying
succession fees to REIT advisers. This contention should be rejected.
An analysis of the Rosenfeld opinion shows that it derives its sub-
stan/rive prohibition from common law sources and not from the lan-
guage of the Act.40 Rosenfeld addresses the language of the Act only
35. Id. at 1343-44.
36. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1970).
37. 445 F.2d at 1345. See notes 39-42 infra and accompanying text.
38. 445 F.2d at 1347 n.13. The court stated:
The prime vice in the realization of profit by an investment adviser or a con-
trolling shareholder from a would-be successor lies in the danger that in re-
turn for this he may exert his influence to secure stockholder approval of the
new or reinstated contract when that may not be the best possible course.
Id.
As the Rosenfeld court recognized, the same rationale has been invoked by numerous
courts to prohibit an officer or director from selling his corporate office for personal
gain. Id. at 1342; cf., Kratzer v. Day, 12 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1926); Gabriel Indus.,
Inc. v. Defiance Indus., Inc., 22 N.Y.2d 405, 239 N.E.2d 706, 293 N.Y.S.2d 65 (1968);
Cox v. Berry, 19 Utah 2d 352, 431 P.2d 575 (1967). Contra, Wright v. Webb, 169
Ark. 1145, 278 S.W. 355 (1925).
39. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C) (1970). Although this test for exemption is
somewhat imprecise, in practice almost all REIT's clearly qualify for the exemption,
since the favorable tax treatment, which is the raison d'etre for REIT's, similarly re-
quires that a large percentage of its income be derived from real estate investments.
See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 856; Wheat & Armstrong, Regulation of Securities of
Real Estate Investment Trusts, 16 Bus. LAw. 919, 924-25 (1961). See note 1 supra.
40. See 445 F.2d at 1342-44. Remarks of Fredric J. Klink, REAL ESTATE INVEST-
MENT TRUSTS-PoBLiEMS AND OPPORTuNrrIEs 186 (Practising Law Institute 1973).
The issue of whether the Investment Company Act preempts state regulation re-
garding an adviser's fiduciary duties with respect to succession fees in the mutual funds
area has not been resolved. Note, Mutual Fund Control, supra note 22, at 395 n.118.
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for the purpose of concluding that it impliedly incorporates equitable
prohibitions previously existing under common law.41  Thus, even if
this implied incorporation concept were rejected, 42  Rosenfeld would
remain strong authority for the -proposition that, as a matter of com-
mon law, REIT advisers may not receive succession fees.
A Direct Challenge to the Common Law Rule of Rosenfeld v. Black
Before considering whether the fiduciary duties enunciated by
Rosenfeld should be applied to an REIT adviser, however, it is first
necessary to consider a contrary interpretation of the mutual fund ad-
viser's duties. SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., (ISI),4  represents
imposing authority to contradict Rosenfeld's holding that the share-
holders of a mutual fund are entitled at common law to recover an ad-
visory succession fee. In the ISI case, shareholders of a corporate
mutual fund adviser sold their controlling interest for a profit despite
the SEC's position that a sale price in excess of the net asset value of
the shares violated both equitable principles and the express provi-
However, exemption of REIT's from the Act and founding the REIT adviser's duty
to forego the charging of a succession fee upon the authority of common law would
appear to obviate any question of federal preemption in the REIT area.
41. See 445 F.2d 1344-45.
42. Even prior to the Rosenfeld case, its conclusion that the Investment Company
Act incorporated the common law prohibition of succession fees was implicitly rejected
by the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Insurance Securities, Inc., 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958). See also Krieger v. Anderson, 40 Del. Ch. 61,
173 A.2d 626 (Ch. 1961), on rehearing, 40 Del. Ch. 151, 177 A.2d 203, afj'd, 40
Del. Ch. 363, 182 A.2d 907 (Sup. Ct. 1962). Subsequent to Rosenfeld this conclusion
was explicitly renounced by the Northern District of Illinois in Kukman v. Baum, 346
F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1972), discussed in notes 85-89 infra and accompanying text.
Based upon substantially similar interpretations of the Act's legislative history, both
the Ninth Circuit and the Northern District of Illinois concluded that Congress did not
intend to incorporate common law fiduciary principles into the Act.
The Ninth Circuit in ISI reached its conclusion that the Act was not intended
to prohibit profit from the sale of controlling stock in an adviser primarily on the
ground that the Act explicitly prohibits assignment of advisory contracts without
shareholder approval but makes no reference to the price paid for the assignment. 254
F.2d at 648-49, 651. In Kukman, the district court concurred with the Ninth Circuit's
analysis in 1SI and further found that Congress had tacitly adopted the result in ISI
by its failure to include in subsequent amendments to the Act any provision proscribing
succession fees. 346 F. Supp. at 62-64.
Some commentators have also voiced strong disagreement with this aspect of the
holding in Rosenfeld. See Note, Common Law Prophylactic Rule, supra note 22, at
1158-63; Note, Mutual Fund Control, supra note 22, at 396-406. See generally Lobell,
Rights and Responsibilities in the Mutual Fund, 70 YALE L.J. 1258 (1961). But see
Greene, Fiduciary Standards of Conduct Under the Investment Company Act of 1940,
28 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 266 (1959).
43. 254 F.2d 642 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 823 (1958).
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sions of the Investment Company Act of 1940.44  In allowing the suc-
cession fee in this form,45 the Ninth Circuit relied upon two closely
related rationales. First, since the advisory contract terminated under
the Act at the moment of the sale of the controlling block of stock,40
and since that sale occurred prior to the date when the adviser was re-
appointed, the adviser technically retained no "office" which it could
have transferred in the sale.47 Second, the court concluded that no
fiduciary duty was breached by the sale because it deemed the succes-
sion fee a payment for the outgoing adviser's expectation of contract
renewal rather than for an asset of the fund.48
These two reasons for the Ninth Circuit's holding that no fidu-
ciary duty was breached have been soundly criticized 9 and cannot with-
stand close scrutiny. The first argument, that in such a case there is
no sale of office because the office has terminated before it could
be sold, is a triumph of form over substance. Whether termination
of the office occurred before, upon, or after the sale of office should be
irrelevant, for a fiduciary duty does not depend upon the existence
of a contract;50 and it is now well established that fiduciary duties can
survive the abdication of a fiduciary office. 1 Furthermore, although
44. By contending that controlling stock can be sold only for its proportionate
share of the net asset value of the corporation, the SEC would have denied even the
premium which a controlling interest in a corporation normally commands. Valuation
of a control premium is discussed in Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HAav.
L. R v. 986, 994-96 (1957). For a discussion delineating a succession fee from the
total purchase price where sale of controlling stock of a mutual fund adviser exceeds
its market price, see Note, Fiduciary Requirements, supra note 22, at 662-65. See also
Newman v. Stein, 464 F.2d 689, 697-98 (2d Cir. 1972).
45. See note 15 supra.
46. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(4), -15(a) (4) (1970).
47. 254 F.2d at 650-51.
48. Id.
49. E.g., Sterrett 236-37; Note, Mutual Fund Control, supra note 22, at 388-94;
Note, Protecting the Interests of Mutual-Fund Investors in Sales of Management-Cor-
poration Control (Or, Policing the Traffic in Other People's Money), 68 YALE L.J. 113,
120-28 (1958).
50. "A fiduciary is a person who undertakes to act in the interest of another per-
son. It is immaterial whether the undertaking is in the form of a contract." Scott,
The Fiduciary Principle, 37 CALiF. L. REv. 539, 540 (1949).
51. E.g., Perlman v. Feldman, 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952
(1955); B.R. Paulsen & Co. v. Lee, 95 Ill. App. 2d 146, 237 N.E.2d 793 (1968);
Opie Brush Co. v. Bland, 409 S.W.2d 752 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966); Matter of Caplan,
20 App. Div. 2d 301, 246 N.Y.S.2d 913, affd, 14 N.Y.2d 679, 198 N.E.2d 908, 249
N.Y.S.2d 877 (1964).
Mutual Fund sponsors create and operate funds in such a manner that the
shareholders are reliant upon the sponsor's external management and admin-
istration. A momentary hiatus in the contractual relationship produced by
the unilateral action of an adviser does not diminish this necessary reliance.
Sterret 236.
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the adviser's contract in ISI had technically terminated when the con-
trolling shareholders transferred their interest, ISI retained control over
the fund's proxy machinery and used this mechanism to secure the ap-
proval by the fund's shareholders of its reappointment of the newly-
controlled fund adviser. 52  Since it is just as improper for a fiduciary to
secure the transfer of his office by influencing trust beneficiaries as it is
to sell his office directly,53 the same fiduciary obligation developed in
the direct sale of office cases should have been imposed in ISI with re-
spect to the conduct of the selling shareholder-directors of the adviser.
The second argument, that succession fees purchase the adviser's
contract renewal expectation rather than a fund asset, is equally un-
persuasive. The awkward borrowing of property concepts to judge
the validity of succession fees simply sidesteps the crucial inquiry into
the adviser's potential conflict of interest. If courts allow advisers to
orchestrate the appointment of successors who will pay the highest pre-
miums,5 the adviser's duty to recommend only the best successor will
be forever interred.5 5 Out of such a concern, the Rosenfeld court even
went so far as to argue that it is immaterial whether the expectation of re-
newal enjoyed by the adviser is considered the fund's or the adviser's
asset.5" However, even if the adviser's contractual expectations are desig-
52. 254 F.2d at 646. Although the Ninth Circuit held that the advisory contract
had terminated immediately upon the unapproved sale of control, see notes 46-47 supra
and accompanying text, it is clear from the opinion that the adviser in fact continued
to serve as the fund's adviser through the time of the proxy solicitation. Id.
The history of mutual funds has shown that the adviser's recommendation of a
successor is virtually certain to be followed by the shareholders. See note 21 supra
and accompanying text.
53. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939); Kratzer v. Day, 12 F.2d 724,
726 (9th Cir. 1926); Clark v. First Nat'l Bank, 219 Iowa 637, 259 N.W. 211 (1935);
A. BERLE & M. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 237 (1932)
(de facto control gives rise to same responsibility attendant upon actual control).
See also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 569 (1932): "A bargain by an official
or shareholder of a corporation for a consideration enuring to him personally to exer-
cise or promise to exercise his powers in the management of the corporation in a par-
ticular way is illegal."
54. Shareholders who deem it in their interest to allow the adviser to select a suc-
cessor and receive a succession fee may of course do so. See text accompanying note
108 infra.
55. It is conceivable that the successor picked by the incumbent will be both the
highest bidder and the most qualified manager. In such a situation a succession fee
might still be denied, because it would seem proper to require that the recipient of
a succession fee show that it had selected the best adviser, and this burden of proving
a negative-that there existed no more competent successor--could well be insuperable.
56. 445 F.2d at 1343. In Ridley v. Continental Ill. Realty, No. C 19550 (Los
Angeles County Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974) (Notice of Intended Decision), discussed in
note 58 infra, the court similarly indicated that succession fees should be treated as
sales of influence rather than sales of property. But the court also utilized the same
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nated a property interest, the succession fee need not necessarily be
an adviser asset. Rather, the transferred property more likely repre-
sents the power to select an adviser in the first instance, a power in-
herently residing in the shareholders of the fund. Even though the
shareholders permit their exercise of this power to be guided by the
adviser, the succession fee may easily be deemed a fund asset.5 7
Because the Ninth Circuit incorrectly assumed that the fee consti-
tuted payment purely for an asset of the adviser, and because the court
failed to perceive the defendant's ability to control the adviser's reap-
pointment, the ISI case should not bar the application of Rosenfeld's
fiduciary analysis to advisory succession fees in the REIT context.
REIT's: A Distinguishable Pattern of Adviser Succession?
Can the Rosenfeld rule be limited to mutual funds, or at least
held inapplicable to REIT's? In the recent case of Ridley v. Continental
Illinois Realty,5  the court, without elaboration, rejected the contention
reasoning to attack Rosenfeld's attempt to analogize succession fees to sales of
fiduciary office. Id. at 27-28.
57. It is significant to note that the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois in Kukman v. Baum, which considered mutual fund adviser succes-
sion after ISI and Rosenfeld, agreed with Rosenfeld that under common law principles
the mutual fund shareholders are entitled to any succession fee realized by its adviser.
Rosenfeld's holding on this point, stated the court, was "so obviously correct" that no
citations were needed to support it. 346 F. Supp. at 61. Kukman's adherence to
Rosenfeld on this point is perhaps all the more impressive because it rejected the im-
plied incorporation doctrine espoused by Rosenfeld and in this respect aligned itself
with ISL Id. at 62-65.
58. No. C 19550 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974) (Notice of
Intended Decision). Although the holding in this case does not decide whether REIT
shareholders have a right to recover a succession fee from the trust's adviser, the case
discusses some aspects of this issue in detail.
In Ridley the corporate adviser of an REIT was merged into its successor, con-
tingent upon approval by the REIT shareholders of the successor's management con-
tract. Ridley, one of the REIT's shareholders, brought suit on behalf of the trust
against its adviser, alleging a breach of fiduciary duty. Urging application of the
prophylactic rule of Rosenfeld, Ridley contended that any amount received by the
adviser's shareholders in excess of the book value of its assets should be paid to the
REIT. Despite the admitted applicability of the common law prohibition against a
fiduciary's sale of its influence, the court recognized that the excess payments might
also be attributed to factors other than the sale of influence. See note 15 supra.
While acknowledging that some portion of the amount received may have been paid
for the adviser's influence over the trust, the court focused on other alleged breaches
of fiduciary duty in granting repayment of all fees received by the advisers during
the period of malfeasance. Id. at 30-32. Among the breaches of duty which the
court attributed to the adviser and its majority shareholder were: (1) disclosing con-
fidential trust information during the merger negotiations; (2) permitting representatives
of the aspiring successor to participate in meetings of the REIT's trustees; and (3)
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that the fiduciary duties of REIT advisers were so distinguishable from
those of mutual fund advisers as to preclude the application of Rosen-
feld in the REIT context. Although the court acknowledged that differ-
ences exist between REIT and mutual fund advisers with respect to their
regulation and function, it found that each bore substantially the same
relationship to the investors whose funds they managed. There is no
doubt that an REIT adviser, like a mutual fund adviser, is a fiduciary:"
both exercise discretionary control over another's property in a relation-
ship founded on the reliance and trust of that other person. 60 But REIT
advisers and mutual fund advisers do not necessarily owe the same obli-
gations to their respective beneficiaries, as the duties of a fiduciary vary
according to the nature of the fiduciary relationship.6'
As pointed out above,6 a comparison of the fiduciary rela-
tionships of both REIT and mutual fund advisers reveals numerous
fundamental similarities. Both assume almost complete management
of the enterprise, determine its investments, remain in office largely at
will, and have power to determine a successor. But despite the signif-
icant similarities, several arguably important distinctions may exist be-
tween REIT and mutual fund advisers.
First, the history of the mutual fund industry reveals numerous in-
stances of fund looting and shareholder abuse due to the sale of ad-
causing the REIT to give the surviving corporation certain warranties which had the
potential of severely restricting the REIT's investment opportunities.
It seems that the court was wrong in not deciding the succession fee issue, as it
represented an additional rather than an alternative ground for recovery. Influencing
the choice of a successor breached a duty separate from those requiring nondisclosure
of confidential information and the operation of the trust for the benefit of its share-
holders. Moreover, although the court imposed a heavy penalty on the outgoing
adviser by forcing it to repay substantial fees, the control premium its shareholders
received represented a gain which did not come from the fees paid by the REIT. Thus,
the principle which the court applied to justify repayment of the management fees-
"that a fiduciary who gains personally at the expense of, or by reason of use or
acquisition of an asset of, his principal, may be required to disgorge to his principal
such gain," id. at 33-should be applicable to the succession fee as well.
59. Compare 4A POWELL 91573B[7] n.100 with SEC v. Capital Gains Research
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 191 (1963) and Kukman v. Baum, 346 F. Supp. 55, 61 (N.D. Ill.
1972) and Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207, 234 (S.D.N.Y.), a!f'd, 294 F.2d 415
(2d Cir. 1961).
60. E.g., Schweickhardt v. Chessen, 329 Ill. 637, 649, 161 N.E. 118, 123 (1928)
("A fiduciary relation ...exists in all cases where confidence is reposed on the one
side and a resulting superiority and influence on the other side arises therefrom").
See generally Scott, supra note 50, at 539.
61. It is obligatory to cite at this juncture perhaps the most often quoted words
of Justice Frankfurter: "[Tie say that a man is a fiduciary only begins analysis.
." SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 85-86 (1943).
62. See text accompanying notes 17-21 supra.
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visory offices."' These abuses were responsible in large part for the
enactment of the Investment Company Act of 1940. 64 The real estate
investment trust field by contrast apparently has not witnessed such
abuses, as evidenced by the lack of corresponding documentation or
enactment of any remedial federal legislation. However, it would be
naive to suggest that REIT advisers are peculiarly beyond temptation,"6
for the lack of documented abuses is quite likely a mere reflection
of the relatively recent origin and growth of REIT's 6 and the fact
that REIT's are only now beginning to experience the adverse eco-
nomic circumstances61 which frequently bring previously existing abu-
sive practices to full public view.68 Similarly, although Congress
acknowledged the danger of mutual fund adviser misconduct by enact-
ing remedial legislation which requires shareholder approval for all
changes in advisory office, the more ancient learning of the common
law, upon which Rosenfeld drew,69 prohibits the sale of a fiduciary
office even in the absence of a statutory shareholder approval require-
ment. ° Most importantly, the rule of Rosenfeld was designed not
63. See SEC, PUBLIC POLICY REPORT 46; SEC, REPORT ON INVSTMENT TRUSTS
AND IvEsrMENT COMPANmEs, H.R. Doc. 279, 76th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. IT, at 1918
(1939).
[Alfter investors have invested in investment companies on their faith
in the reputation and standing of the existing managements, control of the
public's funds has frequently been transferred without the prior knowledge or
consent of stockholders to other persons who have looted the assets of such
companies or to other investment companies which have subjected the stock-
holders to grossly unfair plans of merger, consolidation, or other corporate re-
adjustments. H.R. REP. No. 2639, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 9 (1940).
See S. REP. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. at 7 (1940).
64. Upon the basis of facts disclosed by the record and reports of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. . . it is declared that the national pub-
lic interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected . . . when con-
trol or management . . . [of investment companies] is transferred without
the consent of their security holders . . . . Investment Company Act of
1940, §§ 1(b), 1(b)(6), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l(b), -l(b)(6) (1970).
65. The need for government regulation of REIT's, especially to resolve conflict
of interest problems, has been increasingly noted. Lynn, Real Estate Investment
Trusts: Problems and Prospects, 31 FORDHAm L. Rnv. 73, 103, (1962); Remarks of
S. Douglas Wel, RFAL ESTATE FINANCING; CONTEMPORARY TECHNIQUES at 432 (Prac-
tising Law Institute 1973). Note, supra note 13, at 618 (discussing potential conflict
of interest situations for RErT advisers). See also DIcKEY, supra note 1, at 92.
66. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
67. See note 2 supra and accompanying text.
68. For example, Congress enacted the Securities Act of 1933 as a response to
economic losses suffered by a large segment of the public due to fraudulent stock issu-
ances. See, e.g., W. CARY, supra note 15, at 1295-96.
69. 445 F.2d at 1342. See notes 39-42 supra and accompanying text for the argu-
ment that the Rosenfeld court's imposition of a fiduciary duty on mutual fund advisers
did not depend upon the fact that this common law duty had been incorporated into
the Investment Holding Company Act of 1940.
70. In Rosenfeld the court further stated:
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merely to remedy past abuse but to prevent the potential for abuse. 71
A second possible distinction between REIT and mutual fund ad-
visers is that an REIT adviser contracts, not directly with the benefi-
ciaries as does a mutual fund adviser, but with the REIT trustees,
because in the REIT, the trustees and not the beneficiaries act as legal
owners and principals in conducting the trust's affairs.72 Thus,
the REIT trustee provides an additional check upon the influence
of the REIT adviser. It follows that since the REIT shareholders
are more insulated from the influence of the REIT adviser than
are their counterparts in the mutual fund area,73 the stringent
fiduciary duty imposed upon mutual fund advisers is arguably un-
necessary in the REIT context. The potential effect of this structural
check on the influence of the REIT adviser is most apparent when one
examines the investment process. Whereas mutual fund advisers are
empowered to make investments on behalf of the fund,"4 the REIT
adviser usually can only submit recommendations to the trustees who
then accept or reject the proposed investment.7 Despite this proce-
dural difference, the REIT adviser plays an equally important role in
the investment function. In practice the advisers of both mutual
funds76 and REIT's77 have the power of initiative, since they de-
termine in the first instance which investments appear worthwhile.
Not only are REIT trustees thus restricted to a veto power, but also the
need for prompt action in committing funds for real estate investment
Even ratification by the beneficiaries would not save a fiduciary from account-
ability for any amounts realized in dictating or influencing the choice of a
successor unless this was secured with notice that the beneficiaries were en-
titled to the profit if they wished .... and it is questionable whether such
ratification by a majority of the beneficiaries could bind others or the [flund
itself. 445 F.2d at 1343 (citations omitted).
71. "Experience has taught that, no matter how high-minded a particular fiduciary
may be, the only certain way to insure full compliance with that duty is to eliminate
any possibility of personal gain." 445 F.2d at 1342.
72. 4A POWELL I 573A[16]. The trustees, as the trust's legal owners, are the
proper parties to bring an action for the recovery of succession fees; but should they
prove recalcitrant, a beneficiary can compel recovery by bringing an action directly
against the advisor, joining the trustee as a defendant. Alternatively, the beneficiary
may seek removal of the trustees for breach of trust in permitting the misappropria-
tion of trust property. See G.G. & G.T. BOGERT, AW OF TRusTs §§ 160, 166 (1973);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 294 (1959).
73. See WHARTON STUDy, supra note 19, at 6-9.
74. See SEC PuBLIc POLICY REPORT 45-46.
75. See Remarks of Benito M. Lopez, Jr., REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUSTS 1973,
21 (Practising Law Institute 1973) (sometimes an adviser is empowered to commit
the trust to investments subject to limitations imposed by the trustees); cf. 3 Z. CAvrrcI-H,
Busnqss ORAIzArIONS § 44.06[1][c] (1963); 4A POWELL ff 573B[6][iii].
76. See note 74 supra and accompanying text.
77. See Schulkin, supra note 6, at 36.
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suggests that trustee approval tends to be automatic. 78  While statistics
have not been found, it seems logical in view of the adviser's influence
and expertise that the trustees would rarely reject an adviser's pro-
posed investment.
The aforementioned distinctions thus fail to diminish substantially
the previously noted similarity between the fiduciary relationships of
mutual fund and REIT advisers. It therefore appears that REIT share-
holders need and deserve the same untainted judgment from an ad-
viser as is required of mutual fund advisers under the Rosenfeld rule.
AVOIDING THE RULE IN Rosenfeld
An Exception for Private Trusts-Or for Diversified Advisers?
The defendants in Rosenfeld vainly argued that advisory succes-
sion fees should be allowed for the reason that controlling stock in
banks or trust companies which administer private trusts may be sold
at a profit.7 9  Clearly these corporate trustees are classic fiduciaries
who exercise significant control over the assets they manage. Never-
theless, the Second Circuit in dicta found that the duties owed by these
corporate fiduciaries of private trusts were distinguishable from those
owed by mutual fund advisers on the grounds that "[tihere is . . .
no need to fear that the person who purchases the controlling interest
[in such a corporate trustee] will pay the seller for exerting his in-
fluence to have the purchase approved by the beneficiaries of the
trust."8" Two reasons were given for this observation. First, since
trustee fees are but a minute fraction of the income of a bank or trust
company, the receipt of such fees is an insignificant incentive for the
purchase of its controlling stock.8' Second, as stated by the court, "A
person who selects a bank or trust company as trustee must contem-
78. Some support for this inference may be drawn from the fact that most REIT's
have found it advantageous to delegate investment authority to a special fast-acting trus-
tee investment committee:
Typically, the REIT will establish an investment committee which is author-
ized to make investment decisions between sessions of the full board of trus-
tees. Consequently, the REIT can take advantage of a worthwhile investment
opportunity whenever it happens to arise. The common procedure is to have
the investment committee meet to authorize the investments immediately fol-
lowing the decision by the adviser to recommend the investment to the REIT.
It would also be wise for the Declaration of Trust to fully sanction confer-
ences by telephone . . . . 3 Z. CAvrrcu, supra note 75, at § 44.06[l][c] (foot-
note omitted).
See also 4A POWELL 573B[6][iii].
79. 445 F.2d at 1346-47 n.13.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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plate that a change in control of the corporate trustee may occur during
the life of the trust.""2  This dicta suggests some possible arguments
which might be raised in the REIT context, especially by a bank or a
similarly diversified corporate adviser as justification for the retention
of a succession fee.83
Reading this exception expansively, it could be contended that
the Rosenfeld rule applies only to a "pure' succession fee for services
rendered and not to a sale of a controlling interest in a corporate REIT
adviser.8 4  This argument was rejected as to mutual fund advisers,
however, in Kukman v. Baum.8 5 In Kukman controlling stock in a
corporation which advised three mutual funds was sold at a profit,
whereupon the advisory contract was reinstated.8 0 Even though the ad-
viser's investment policy and managerial personnel did not change fol-
lowing the sale of control, the United States District Court for the North-
ern District of Illinois stated in dicta that Rosenfeld's common law
fiduciary duty should apply to the sale of a controlling interest in a
corporate adviser.8 7  The important issue, observed the court, is not
the method by which adviser succession is procured,88 but rather whether
the results produce the same danger of adviser conflict of interest.8"
Despite the broad language in Kukman, the distinction between
sale of control in a corporate adviser and receipt of an outright suc-
cession fee gains more credence if the adviser is a large, diversified en-
terprise which receives only a "minute fraction" of its income from
82. Id.
83. Banks such as Bank of America, Chase Manhattan, Union Bank, and Wells
Fargo have all sponsored REF's. Meyer & Sprayregen, supra note 1, at 82.
84. Rosenfeld expressly states no opinion as to whether its rule is applicable to
a succession fee received upon sale of control. 445 F.2d at 1346. The Second Cir-
cuit noted that ISI, which had permitted a succession fee, involved a sale of control;
but the court distinguished 1SI on the technical ground that in 1SI the SEC proceeded
under a different section of the Investment Company Act than did the plaintiffs in
Rosenfeld. However, the Rosenfeld court did carefully suggest that its decision might
be applicable to sale of control situations. Id.
85. 346 F. Supp. 55 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
86. 346 F. Supp. at 56-59. Kukman actually involved two sales of control, the
first from a group of individual shareholders to a corporation which subsequently resold
the stock. Id. at 56.
87. Id. at 61. While Kukman found Rosenfeld indistinguishable on its facts, Kuk-
man reached a different result by rejecting Rosenfeld's conclusion that the common
law principles denying a succession fee were impliedly incorporated into the Investment
Company Act. Id. at 62-65. See notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text. No men-
tion is made in Kukman of whether a claim asserted under state law would have been
successful or whether state law had been preempted. See note 40 supra.
88. These methods are outlined in note 15 supra.
89. See 346 F. Supp. at 61.
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managing an REIT.90 Arguably, the succession fee would be too small
relative to the whole transaction to influence the motivations of either
the buyer or the seller. One would not be likely to sell control of a
large, diversified corporation merely to capitalize on the possibility of
retaining a succession fee which would constitute only a small frac-
tion of the corporation's total value. Therefore, as the number of per-
sons to whom the adviser owes a fiduciary duty increases, the less prac-
tical it is to expect that, upon sale of control of that adviser, the seller
should be required to consider solely what is best for any particular
beneficiary; 91 and as the adviser's other sources of income increase,
there becomes less of an incentive for the adviser to seek profit by vio-
lating his fiduciary duty to the REIT's shareholders.
If the sale of a controlling interest in a large, diversified REIT
does violate a duty, identifying that part of the purchase price
which represents a succession fee would be difficult.92 But the
mere difficulty of ascertaining the proper amount of recovery should
not completely bar application of Rosenfeld's prophylactic rule.98
For although the Investment Company Act provides some safeguards
for mutual fund shareholders, there is no statutory requirement that
sale of control in an REIT adviser automatically terminates the advi-
sory contract. Moreover, even where a termination-upon-agreement
provision is expressly included in the advisory agreement,9 4 such a
provision may provide only illusory shareholder protection, because
as was demonstrated by the facts of the ISI case,9" it can be evaded.
90. It may have been appropriate for Kukman to have addressed this problem.
The adviser in that case, in addition to advising three mutual funds, also managed
investment portfolios for others. Defendants' Memorandum for Summary Judgment at
18. The defendants contended that a sale of control was distinguishable from the form
of succession in Rosenfeld on the ground that the corporation and not its shareholders
is the fiduciary. Id. at 53. The common law of trusts has generally viewed the cor-
porate entity as the fiduciary. BOGERT, supra note 72, at § 531.
91. The adviser with numerous beneficiaries might argue that its primary duty is
to pick the most competent successor to advise all the beneficiaries as a class.
92. See generally Note, Fiduciary Requirements, supra note 22, at 663-65.
93. Cf. 11 S. WmLIsToN, CoNTaAcrs § 1342 (Jaeger, 3d ed. 1968).
94. At least some, and probably most, REIT advisory contracts provide for auto-
matic termination if the adviser attempts to "assign" the contract. See 4A POWELL
% 573B[6][b][iv]. Query whether such a provision could be construed to apply to
all forms of advisory succession or whether as a matter of the common law of con-
tracts only more direct forms of adviser assignment are prohibited. See Investment
Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a) (4) (1970) (broadly defining assignment
to include sale of control); 4 A. CoRsiN, CoNTRActs § 865 (1951) (contracts for per-
sonal services involving skill and judgment are not assignable).
95. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
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Nor are REIT shareholders statutorily required to approve the succes-
sor." Where these features are absent, or ineffective, neither the trust-
ees nor the shareholders may have an immediate check upon advisory
succession. 97
Even if control in a large, diversified corporate adviser is
generally sold without regard to the value of the attendant advi-
sory contract, the purchaser is likely to be the highest overall bidder
rather than the most qualified adviser. If the succession fee is truly
insignificant to the parties, advisory succession can be accomplished by
an alternative method producing less risk to the REIT shareholders.
For instance, it could be required that the advisory position and all
elements of control over that position, such as offices and director-
ships, be completely relinquished before the sale, or that the adviser
recommend a new adviser controlled by parties other than the pur-
chasers of its controlling interest.9, In either event, open competition
for the vacated position might be created, thereby resulting in a bene-
fit to the shareholders in the form of more profitable investment ad-
vice or lower management fees.99 Thus, while there may be less
incentive for abdication of fidiciary duty when the succession oc-
curs as a sale of control in a large, diversified corporate adviser, this
should not exempt such transactions from Rosenfeld's general prohibi-
96. See 3 Z. CAvrrcH, supra note 75, at § 44.07. For an example of a typical dec-
laration of trust which leaves the selection of an adviser to the discretion of the trus-
tees, see REAL ESTATE IvsrmNr ThusTs 1973, 37 (Practising Law Institute 1973).
97. Such safeguards may also fail because some or all of the trustees and the re-
maining shareholders may not know that the controlling stock in the adviser has been
sold. Depending upon the terms of the trust agreement and advisory contract, the
shareholders may have the power to remove the trustees at any time by majority vote
and the trustees may have the power to terminate the advisory agreement at any time.
However, even under such a carefully worded contract, before the shareholders could
remove an adviser they did not want, they would first have to learn about the sale
of control, call a shareholders' meeting, vote to remove the trustees, elect new trustees,
and, as would probably be prudent, arrange for a new adviser.
98. In the absence of such a provision, it could almost always be contended that
a succession fee was included in the purchase price paid for controlling interest in
a corporate REIT adviser. The plaintiff shareholders in ISI contended that any
amount above a corporate adviser's net asset value constituted a succession fee. 254
F.2d at 647. See note 15 supra.
99. If a prospective adviser is willing to pay a succession fee to the incumbent,
it would probably be willing to pay a like amount to the trust, see Sterrett 211, per-
haps in the form of lower advisory fees if not as a direct lump sum payment.
If the result of denying succession fees was to increase shareholder profits, a col-
lateral benefit to the increased fairness to shareholders might be the investment of ad-
ditional capital in RErM's, thereby forwarding a major Congressional purpose for enact-
ing favorable REIT tax treatment-providing additional capital for the construction in-
dustry. H.R. REP. No. 2020, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1960).
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tion of advisory succession fees. 100
Contractual Exculpation for Succession Fees
For the REIT adviser that wishes to receive a succession fee, a
more promising approach than seeking a common law loophole would
be to create a contractual loophole by means of an exculpatory clause. 1' 1
Accordingly, since Rosenfeld, some advisory contracts have contained
provisions explicitly stating that REIT shareholders do not have any
interest in the proceeds from the sale of the adviser's shares."0 2 Al-
though such exculpatory clauses can relieve a fiduciary of liability,0 3
courts will generally not give them effect unless certain conditions are
met. First, exculpatory provisions are strictly construed against the
fiduciary; to be effective, the provision relied upon must clearly de-
scribe the act to be excused and the extent to which liability is re-
lieved.104 Thus, a provision which permitted a succession fee upon
sale of the adviser's controlling shares would probably not permit a suc-
cession fee obtained by any other means. 10 5 Second, an exculpatory
provision will not be given effect if it is against public policy.'00 Since
retention of a succession fee allows the adviser, while operating under
a conflict of interests, to influence the appointment of his successor, the
trust is unnecessarily jeopardized if the trustees gratuitously permit
a succession fee.10 7  Of course, if the shareholders knowingly and freely
approve even a gratuitous succession fee provision, it does not violate
public policy: absent harm to another, the shareholders may treat
their own property as they wish.' 0 8
100. The desired weight to be given shareholder protection increases when it is con-
sidered that the principal investors in REIT's are small shareholders who are senior
citizens. A survey of REIT shareholders conducted early in 1972 disclosed that 78%
were individuals and 61% owned less than 300 shares each. Buffington, supra note 1, at
276.
101. But see Remarks of Fredric J. Kink, supra note 40, at 187 ("Whether that
kind of a boot strap is effective is debatable.").
102. Id. at 187. For an example of such an exculpatory clause see REAL ESTATE
INVDESTMENT TRusTs 1973, 58-59 (Practising Law Institute 1973).
103. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959).
104. 3 A. ScoTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 222.2 (3d ed. 1967).
105. For the means by which a succession fee may be realized, see note 15 supra.
106. A. SCOTT, supra note 104, at § 222.3.
107. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, at § 222.2.
108. See A. SCOTT, supra note 104, at § 216. Similarly, subsequent ratification by
the beneficiaries, if made knowingly and willfully precludes a fiduciary's liability for
breach of trust. Id. § 218. For support of the statement that knowledge and
willfulness are essential to the validity of such a ratification, see note 70 supra.
An example of a provision in a trust agreement requiring the trustees to insert
an exculpatory clause in the advisory agreement may be found in REAL ESTATE IN-
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A more difficult public policy question is presented where it can
be shown that the trustees, without specific shareholder approval, re-
ceived valuable consideration on behalf of the trust in exchange for the
agreement to the exculpatory clause. In support of such an exculpa-
tory provision, it can be argued that the trustees pursuant to their man-
agement powers may reasonably choose to augment the trust by ac-
cepting a sum certain for exposing it to a risk which may never oc-
cur. Whether such conduct breaches the trustees' duty of care and
loyalty cannot be ascertained without analysis of all the relevant fac-
tors, such as the value of the consideration received, the apparent likeli-
hood and result of adviser succession, the personal interests of the trus-
tees in inserting such a provision, and existing contractual modification
of the trustees' duties.10 Since an exculpatory provision is likely to be
inserted at the insistence of the adviser, not only may the trustees be
liable for breaching their duty of discretion or loyalty by inserting such
a clause, but also the adviser may be liable for its participation in the
trustees' breach of duty. 910 Thus, while an exculpatory clause per-
mitting succession fees inserted without shareholder approval may be
valid, disputes over the legality of succession fees can best be avoided
by obtaining express shareholder approval of such clauses.
A FAIRNEsS TEST AS AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
The preceding sections of this Note indicate that it is appro-
priate, absent an exculpatory clause, to prevent all succession fees as
a means of avoiding any adverse effects on an REIT when its adviser
VESTMENT TRusTs 1973, 37 (Practising Law Institute 1973).
See also Ridley v. Continental 111. Realty, No. C 19550 (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct., Jan. 22, 1974) (Notice of Intended Decision). In Ridley, the shareholders
ratified certain of the adviser's actions which were otherwise in violation of fiduciary
obligations. Ratification was ineffective because full disclosure of the underlying facts
was absent.
109. A trustee in managing the trust must utilize "the care, skill, prudence, and
diligence of an ordinarily prudent businessman engaged in similar business affairs and
with objectives similar to those of the trust in question." BOGERT, supra note 72, at
§ 541. However, this duty of care like the adviser's fiduciary duty discussed above,
may be modified by an exculpatory clause. Id. § 542. A typical exculpatory clause
for REIT trustees relieves them of liability except for bad faith, willful misconduct and
gross negligence. Remarks of Fredric J. Klink, supra note 40, at 178. 3 Z. CAvrrcH,
supra note 75, at § 44.06[1][f].
110. If inducing the trustees to insert the exculpatory clause breaches the adviser's
duty to the trust, the adviser cannot assert that the clause is valid. See BOGERT, supra
note 72, at § 167. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 103, at § 326: "A third person
who, although not a transferee of trust property, has notice that the trustee is com-
mitting a breach of trust and participates therein is liable to the beneficiary for any
loss caused by the breach of trust."
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acts in this conflict of interest situation. A different approach to judg-
ing whether profits from succession should be allowed REIT advisers
is exemplified by the policy statements of the Midwest Securities Com-
missioners Association (MSCA) regarding REIT's.111 Although even
the member states of the MSCA are not required to adopt its statements
of policy,"'2 these statements have served as models for many blue sky
regulations dealing specifically with REIT's,113 and as such they are
probably the most important current influence on positive law dealing
specifically with the fiduciary relationship of REIT advisers."4
The MSCA's most recent statement of policy of REIT's was
adopted on July 16, 1970, almost a year prior to the Second Circuit's
decision in Rosenfeld."5 Thus, it is not surprising that this statement
of policy does not specifically address the conflict of interest situation
giving rise to succession fees."1 " However, the 1970 statement con-
tains a broad "Self Dealing" section which appears to be aimed at
111. For a brief description of the MSCA see 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 4751 (1969).
112. Even if these statements are not incorporated into a state's regulations, they
affect industry practice because they are the view of the MSCA. Remarks of Edward
J. McAniff, REAL EsTATE INVESTMENT TRusTs 80 (Practising Law Institute 1970).
113. "Jt may be assumed that the Statement of Policy will be utilized to some extent
by each of the member states in any legislation they may adopt." 3 Z. CAviTCH supra
note 75, at § 44.07[3][b][i].
Nine states have modeled their blue sky regulations after an MSCA statement of
policy. See 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (Alas.) 11 6046 (1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (Cal.)
8625 (1972); 2 BLUE SKY L REP. (Iowa) 18,636 (1971); 2 BLuE SK' L.
REP. (Mo.) 28,606 (1972); 3 BLuE SKY L. RP. (S.D.) 44,629 (1972); 3
BLuE SKY L. REP. (Tenn.) 1 45,626 (1967); 31 BLUE SKY L. REP. (Tex.) 46,661
(1967); 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (Wash.) 111 50,641, 50,650 (1972); 3 BLUE SKY L.
REP. (Wis.) % 57,732 (1970).
Five other states have also enacted blue sky regulations dealing expressly with
REIT's. See 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. (Fla.) 13,613 (1972); 1 BLUE SKY L. REP.
(Idaho) 77f 15,701, 15,713 (1970); 2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (Mich.) 25,640 (1972);
2 BLUE SKY L. REP. (Miss.) % 27,941 (1964); 3 BLUE SY L. REP. (Va.) 1 49,614
(1972).
114. See Remarks of Charles A. Goldstein, REAL ESTATE FINANCING: CONTEMPO-
RARY TE NHQuEs 433 (Practising Law Institute 1973) (noting that blue sky laws ap-
pear to provide the only specific state regulation of REIT's); Wheat & Armstrong, supra
note 39, at 925-26.
The Real Estate Advisory Committee of the SEC has recommended that a study
be conducted of REIT's to formulate proposals for specific REIT regulation by the
SEC. DICKEY, supra note 1, at 93-94.
115. 1 BLUE SKY L. REP. 1 4801 (1971). This statement supersedes earlier state-
ments of policy and their revisions, which presently provide the pattern for regulations
in some states. For some of these earlier statements see id. 111 4751-58 (1969). The
North American Securities Administrators Association, Inc., has also adopted the 1970
Statement. Id. 1 4801.
116. See Remarks of Thomas Nelson, REAL ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUsTs 107-08,
112-13 (Practising Law Institute 1970).
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various forms of adviser profiteering in conflict of interest situations:
"No . .. adviser shall ... receive any commission or other
remuneration, directly or indirectly, in connection with the purchase
or sale of trust assets . . .. "I However, this section proceeds
further to permit an adviser's purchase or sale of trust assets if certain
conditions are satisfied. First, the transaction must be "fair and rea-
sonable to the shareholders." ' Furthermore, it must be at a price "not
exceeding the fair value thereof as determined by independent ap-
praisal.""' 9  And lastly, it must be approved "by a majority of the
trustees, including a majority of the independent trustees."' 20
Some textual difficulty exists in reading the MSCA statement of
policy as applicable to succession fees.' 2' Nevertheless, regardless of
117. 1970 Statement I B.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. By "independent trustee" the MSCA statement of policy means trustees
who are not affiliated with the adviser or any organization affiliated with the adviser.
The MSCA further requires that a majority of the trustees be unaffiliated and that
all trustees be elected annually. Id. 1 A.
An earlier MSCA statement of policy contained substantially the same broad pro-
hibition against adviser self-dealing but did not contain these exemption provisions.
1 BLuE SKY L. REP. 1 4754 (1969) ("No . . .adviser . . .may . . . receive a com-
mission or other remuneration, directly or indirectly, in connection with the disposal
or acquisition of trust assets"). This provision still appears in some state regulations.
See, e.g., 3 BLUE SKY L. REP. (Tex.) 46,661 (1967). Hence, this earlier formulation
against adviser self dealing, by not allowing any exceptions, provided perhaps a more
persuasive basis than the 1970 Statement for contending that succession fees should
not be allowed.
121. For the initial prohibition of the self dealing section to be applicable to suc-
cession fees, it must be held that the adviser has sold a "trust asset." As pointed
out earlier, the Ninth Circuit in ISI rejected the contention that any asset of the trust
had been sold in the transfer of control of the adviser. See text accompanying notes
48, 54-57 supra. Nevertheless, the penultimate sentence of the self dealing section sug-
gests that this section's prohibition extends to transactions not involving the sale of
assets. That sentence reads: "All such transactions and all other transactions in which
any such persons have any direct or indirect interest shall be approved by a majority
of the trustees, including a majority of the independent trustees." 1970 Statement B
(emphasis added). "All such transactions" refers to purchases or sales of trust assets,
whereas "all other transactions" seems to be a dragnet provision. The statement of
policy gives no indication what these "other transactions" might be; but by including
all transactions in which the adviser has a direct or indirect interest, and which, by
implication, affect the trust in some way, the provision would appear to apply to a
succession fee contract between an outgoing adviser and an incoming one. Thus, a
succession fee would be permissible only if approved by a majority of the trustees,
including a majority of the independent trustees. (The independent appraisal and fair
and reasonable requirements do not apply to "other transactions.") Precisely what
must be approved is unclear. For instance, it could be argued that the actual contract
between the outgoing and incoming adviser must be approved by the trustees, since
approval of the incoming adviser's contract would not constitute approval by the trus-
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whether it actually so applies, the important question raised is whether
courts should apply the general prohibition of succession fees stem-
ming from Rosenfeld or disallow succession fees only if they are "un-
fair" to the shareholders. 122
As an abstract proposition, it is unobjectionable to allow an REIT
adviser a "fair and reasonable" succession fee: where there is no dan-
ger to the shareholders, the adviser could be permitted to be compen-
sated for any risk that was taken in organizing the trust or any good-
will which had accrued to it in the course of a successful advisory re-
lationship. 2 With trustee approval and a prior independent appraisal
of the value of these factors, a court would not have to rely upon the
adviser's own judgment as to what was fair. Similarly, continued use
of expert appraisal might develop helpful guidelines for judicially as-
sessing the fairness of a succession fee.
But enthusiasm for the fairness standard dampens upon analysis
of the results achieved in other areas of fiduciary regulation. 24 Re-
quiring a court to determine what is fair in a complex business situa-
tion frequently calls for a difficult, subjective evaluation. Realizing that
a high degree of subjectivity is involved, a court may too often hesi-
tate to upset a transaction and too readily defer to the judgment of
others.2 5 For example, in a great majority of derivative suits brought
by minority shareholders contending that controlling shareholders have
paid themselves salaries in excess of a fair and reasonable compensa-
tion, courts defer to the "business judgment" of those who set their own
salaries.'2 6 Therefore, in applying a fairness test to advisory succes-
sion fees the courts would be likely to strike down only those fees which
patently and egregiously exceeded a reasonable estimate. As a result
the advisory office would continue to be regularly transferred to the
tees of the outgoing adviser's retention of the succession fee. Cf. Brief for Plaintiffs/
Appellants at 34-36, Rosenfeld v. Black, 445 F.2d 1337 (2d Cir. 1971).
122. It has been suggested that a fairness test of this type should be applied to
the allowability of succession fees for mutual fund advisers. See Note, Common tan'
Prophylactic Rule, supra note 22, at 1164-65; 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1029, 1040-42
(1971).
123. See note 15 supra and accompanying text. For a discussion of the propriety
of rewarding entrepreneurial risk by mutual fund advisers and the feasibility of using
management fees rather than succession fees as the proper compensation vehicle, see
Sterrett 266-73.
124. See Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAw. 35, 57 (1966).
125. See F. O'NEAL & J. DEvwiN, ExpuLsioN oR OppREsSIoN OF BusiNEss Associ-
ATEs: "SQuEmz=-Otrrs" IN SMALL ENmRPRISES §§ 3.06, 8.02 (1961).
126. See Note, Executive Compensation in Close Corporations: The Need for a
Modified Judicial Approach to the Reasonableness Test, 1972 DuKE LJ. 1251, 1263-
69.
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highest bidder and not necessarily to the most qualified successor.
Even if the courts were willing to apply a fairness test rigor-
ously in this setting, neither prior independent appraisal nor trustee ap-
proval seem likely to cure the defects of the fairness test. For a court
to require prior independent appraisal as a matter of common law
would apparently be an unprecedented and unlikely step. Even
if appraisal were worth the cost involved, appraisal works best
when there exists some established market from which to extrapolate,
and it is doubtful whether a meaningful market for REIT adviser suc-
cession could be established. 12 7  In addition, trustee approval as con-
templated by the MSCA would be effective only if a court were first
willing to require that REIT's have independent trustees."28 At present,
however, REIT advisers seem to dominate even these financially un-
interested trustees. 12 9
While a fairness test rather than a flat prohibition now governs
the permissibility of fiduciary profits in many self dealing situations in
corporate law,130 the change from the prophylactic rule to the per-
missive one has been accomplished cautiously and only after consider-
able experience showed the prophylactic rule to be too impractical.' 31
It would be premature to adopt a fairness test and its inherent limita-
tions in protecting REIT shareholders at this time. However, if it can
be established that practical considerations tend to make a prophylac-
tic rule forbidding succession fees unworkable, especially with regard
to large, diversified advisers, the fairness test may develop into a pref-
erable rule of law, particularly if legislation or regulations are adopted
to increase shareholder protection in REIT's.
127. See note 15 supra describing the different means by which advisory succession
can occur. The adviser's control over approval of a successor can prevent the forma-
tion of a market. The SEC has warned that in the sale of an adviser "competition
cannot be relied upon to provide the necessary safeguards because the managements
control over the fund is sufficiently strong so that the prospective successors to the
relationship will bid for the favor of the existing management rather than for the favor
of the fund and its shareholders." SEC PUBLIC POLICY REPOkT at 151.
128. Existence of independent trustees in REIT's is required by the MSCA in para-
graph A of the 1970 Statement. "A majority of the trustees shall not be affiliated
with the adviser of the trust or any organization affiliated with the adviser of the
trust." But in the states which do not have such a blue sky requirement no independ-
ent trustees are required. See Remarks of Benito M. Lopez, Jr., supra note 75, at 24.
It has been stated that normally only a bare majority of REIT trustees are independent.
See note 8 supra.
129. See notes 8-12 supra and accompanying text.
130. "[R]eview of legal history in this area seems to demonstrate that the courts
have progressed from condemnation, to toleration, to encouragement of conflict of in-
terest." Marsh, supra note 124, at 57.
131. See id. at 36-48.
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CONCLUSION
Analysis of the common law principles relied upon in Rosenfeld
to prohibit a mutual fund adviser from realizing a succession fee jus-
tifies the denial of succession fees to REIT advisers as well. How-
ever, if it can be convincingly demonstrated that this prophylactic rule
is impractical in the context of REIT operations, it should be replaced
by a rule which allows only fair and reasonable succession fees. In
the meantime, an REIT adviser can safely receive a succession fee only
if it has obtained the knowing and voluntary consent of the share-
holders.
